Loss of the Colonies
With the new conditions, it had become more and more challenging for Britain to hold up or even the appear as a world power. Hoping partly to startle its stagnant economy, partly to crush the Franco-German 'alliance', Britain tried to enter the EEC and failed twice. Britain backed out of most of the remaining colonies with carelessly haste to avert being cornered in a costly conflict with local nationalist movements as they did in India. In 1959, the British authorities went public with the scheduled withdrawal from Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika and all became self-governed between 1961 and 1963. But the British leader insisted that Britain would remain a world power and assured this with nuclear deterrent and a continuing influence in the ex-colonial world. But it was not that easy. In 1965 the white settler revolted in Southern Rhodesia and Britain's failing attempts to stop it was hugely embarrassing and brought furious condemnation from many of the new states within the Commonwealth. It got more and more costly to protecting the new federation of Malaysia against Indonesian aggression in South East Asia. The burden became unsustainable when British economy staggered from crisis to crisis, ending in the devaluation of the pound in November 1967 and the withdraw Britain's military presence east of Suez followed within
End of Empire
The lines of imperial age had been drawn when Britain finally entered the EEC in 1973. But it is rarely a tidy affair when an empire comes to an end. The rebellions in Rhodesia proceeded until the late 1970s. As late as 1982 Britain fought a war to retain their colony Falkland Islands and, with the tacit Chinese agreement, Hong Kong continued as a British state until 1997. Apart from these issues Britain now had to come to terms with the large inflow of migrants, mostly from South Asia, an unforeseen legacy of their imperial past. Old imperial links still survive In the 21st century, particularly those based on language and law, which may assume growing importance in a globalized
Chris is a science and political journalist and commentator and the author of three books, including the New York Times bestselling The Republican War on Science --dubbed "a landmark in contemporary political reporting" by and a "well-researched, closely argued and amply referenced indictment of the right wing's assault on science and scientists" by Scientific American -- Storm World , and Unscientific America: How Scientific Illiteracy Threatens Our Future , co-authored by Sheril Kirshenbaum. They also write "The Intersection" blog together for Discover blogs. For a longer bio and contact information, see here .
In terms of armament production and weapons technology, the Ottomans remained roughly equivalent with their European rivals throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.   The theory that Ottoman cannon foundries neglected mobile field guns by producing oversized siege cannon at a disproportionate rate has been debunked by the military historian Gábor Ágoston.  Despite the Orientalistic claim that an inherent conservatism in Islam prevented the Ottomans from adopting European military innovations, it is now known that the Ottomans were receptive to foreign techniques and inventions, and continued to employ European renegades and technical experts throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.   In terms of productive capacity, the Ottomans were even able to surpass their European rivals during the seventeenth century. They maintained full self-sufficiency in gunpowder production until the late eighteenth century, and with rare and brief exceptions were continually able to produce enough cannon and muskets to supply their whole armed forces as well as surplus stockpiles.  According to Gábor Ágoston and Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman defeats in the 1683–99 and 1768–74 wars with the Habsburgs and Russia are best explained by the strain on logistics and communications caused by multi-front warfare rather than Ottoman inferiority in technology and armaments, as such inferiority, insofar as it existed at all, was far less significant than had formerly been believed.   It is now believed that the Ottoman military was able to maintain rough parity with its rivals until the 1760s, falling behind as a consequence of a long period of peace on its western front between 1740 and 1768, when the Ottomans missed out on the advances associated with the Seven Years' War .